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Setting and Scope
The recurring alternations of prosperity anddepression we now
call business cycles have been a prominent featureof capitalist
economies for at least a hundred and fifty years.Systematic
thought about the causes and control of economiccrises goes
back over a century. For perhaps fifty yearsbusiness cycle re-
search has been pursued on a large scale, as suchthings go. Yet
even today we knowrelatively little about what happens during
business cycles. In whatever direction speculationabout the
causes of cycles turns, one comes upagainst hard questions of
fact. Do prices fluctuate more violently thanwages? Do costs
rise during the last stages of business expansions?Does construc-
tion activity turn down before or after businessactivity at large?
Do consumers save a larger or smaller portion of theirincomes in
prosperity than in depression? The unsettled questions arein-
numerable, and many must be answered before a firmlyfounded
theory of business cycles will be possible.
To find answers to some of the many questions is the aim ofthe
National Bureau's systematic investigation of businessfluctuations.
By adding to the materials from which an explanation maybe con-
structed, we hope to provide students of cycles with more compre-
hensive and tested information about the phenomena they are at-
tempting to explain.
This book, a report on a portion of the larger study, examines an
almost virgin territory, manufacturers' inventories.
iImportance o/ Inventory Fluctuations
Students of business cycles will not demand documentation for the
assertion that fluctuations in inventories, though not utterly neg-
lected, have, until recent years, occupied only a minor placein bothdescriptions of business cycles and speculationabout theircaus In the minds of businessmen theaccumulation andliquidation of stocks have playeda larger role. With some notable
exceptioni, however, even professional economistswho stress theinstabilityof business investment have neglectedinventories. They
emphasize rather fluctuations in theproduction of durablecapital equip. ment and construction.Investment in inventories,thoughoften recognized as subjectto many of the influencesthatdetermine other types ofinvestment, is usually relegatedto a secondary position.
The root cause hasundoubtedly beenlack of knowledge
about the size of inventoriesand of the rateat which theyare builtup and liquidated.Fortunately this situationis changing.Thespecu. lative inventory boomof 1920 andthe eventsconnected withthe recession of 1937-38drew the attentionof economiststo inventory movements and stimulatedgovernment and businessto moreac- tive collection ofinformation. At thesame time thepublication of Simon Kuznets'estimates of capitalformation providedthe first comprehensive estimatesof inventoriesand ofinventory invest.. meat.1 With thesedata it is possibleto establish therole of stocksin the fluctuationsof capitalinvestment andof businessat large. Table ipresents a compositepicture of thechanges intotal na- tional productionduring the fivebusiness cyclesbetween thetwo worldwars and of theportion of thosechanges thattook the fonn of changes ininventoryinvestment, thatis, in therate of produc- tion of goodsthat wereadded toor removed fromstock. For busi- ness expansionsthe underlyingfiguresare the differencesbetween the standingsof each elementof grossnational productin trough years and thosein succeedingpeakyears; the figuresfor contrac- tions are thedifferencesbetween peakand succeedingtrough years. The changesfor each fullcycleare the differencesbetween the changesduring theexpansions andcontractions thatmake up each cyclemeasured fromtrough totrough. Thefigures in Table are averages forthe fiveexpansions,contractions,and full cycles.
1Thterms foflowcurrent usage ineconomics.'Inventories'are the stock
heM bybusiness ata given time.'Inventoryinve3tment', thenet volume of
goods addedto, or removed
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During contractions changes in inventory investment consti-
tuted an even bigger part of the average change in total output.
The average decline appears to have been nearly half,47 percent,
the average decline in gross national product. Theaverage cyclical
decline in investment in manufacturers' inventories alonewas
about one-fourth the average decline in total output.
The results of taking expansions and contractions togetherare,
of course, intcrmcdiate between those obtained by taking each
phase separately. The average fluctuation in total output from
trough to peak and back again was over $ig billion. About32 per-
cent apparently took the form of changes in the rate of investment
in inventories generally; excluding farmers, the sharewas over 28
percent; inventory investment by manufacturers was overt6 per-
cent.
Cyclical changes in inventory investmentare not only a large
part of changes in total output; they are comparable in size with
changes in construction and in the output of producer durable
equipment, elements that have received farmore attention in busi-
ness cycle research. Indeed, on the face of Kuznets' estimates, fluc-
tuations in inventory investment appear to be much larger than in
either of the other principal components of total capital formation.
The average change in total inventory investment duringexpan-
sions was23percent of the average change in total output, in con-
struction, 6 percent, and in producer durable goods,14 percent. In
contractions the figures were47 percent for inventory investment,
i i percent for construction, and 26 percent for producer durables.
Manufacturers' inventory investment alone apparently accounted
for just about as large a portion of theaverage cyclical change in
total output as did changes in the output of producer durables, and
for a larger portion than construction. Similarstatements might be
made about the relative size of the fluctuations in inventoryinvest-
ment and in the production of consumer durable goods, another
component of output whose instability has attracted attention in
analyses of cycles.
These comparisons of the size of cyclical fluctuations inthe vail-
ous categories of output take on even more importance whencon-
sidered in connection with the average flow of goods withineach
category. The absolute amount by which output ina certain cate-gory increases between depression and prosperity depends
partly
on its sensitivity to changes in business activity andpartly on i
size. The changes in the flow of nondurable goodsand of servj
to consumers are large: the average full cycle changeswere some
$3.2and $2.6 billion, respectively. But thesearc the largestcom-
ponents; their average annual value for the entireperiod '919.38
were some $36 and $24 billion, respectively. Jn viewof theiraver-
age size, the fluctuations are small; theseare stable categories.Pro- ducer and consumer durable goodsand Constructionare far k
stable. Their average cyclical fluctuations,$3.6, $.g,and $1.5
billion, are to be set againstaverage annual rates ofproductjo of only $5.1, $6.3, and $7.i billion.By the same criteria,the cycles in inventory investmentare the most violent of all. Theaverage full cycle change was $6.3 billionfor total inventoryinvestment and $3.2 billion for manufacturers'investment. Theaverage annual in.. vestment in all inventories, however,was no more than $560mil- lion, and that inmanufacttircrs' stocks only$360 million.
Thcse estimatesare, of course, crude, butthey aresufllciaitly accurate to establish severalimportant propositions.One is that, on the average, a veryconsiderable portion ofthe cyclicalchanges in total output hasbeen in the formof a change inthe volume of goods added to stocks.A second is that,during ordinarybusij, cycles,4 fluctuationsin the rate ofinventory investmentas a whole have been larger, interms of the value ofgoods involved, thanthe in constructionor in the flow of durablegoods to eitherproducers or consumers. Anda third proposition isthat inventoryinvestment, in terms of violenceof fluctuation, isthe most volatileof the main components of output. InChapter21we shall see whetherthese statements suggestedby theaverage behavior ofinventories apply regularly to businesscycles in case aftercase, and whether theyare equally applicableto cycles of alltypes.
2Inventories inBusiness CycleLiterature These broadfindings clearlyestablish the primeimportance of in- ventory fluctuationsin businesscycles. Theyemphasize the need for furtherwork toUncover the character
and causes of inventory In Chapter2we shall findreason to distinguishbetween longer and shorter cycles.
8
CHAPTER ON'Ricydop,dia of thi Social Scisncis(Macmillan, zg), 111, 104.
cydes and to gauge their influenceupon business in general. As a
first step, it will be useful to review the work ofearlier writers.
Though necessarily tentative and basedon a fragmentary view of
the actual behavior of stocks, their theoriesare still a useful intro-
duction to this book. Their conclusions illustrate wellthe range of
issues to which our investigation is relevant. Implicitlyor explicitly,
their theories impute a certain pattern of behaviorto inventories
during business cycles; they suggest the factorsthat govern the
movements of inventories; and they indicatea number of the ways
in which inventory fluctuations may influence businessin general.
A comprehensive review of the literature of businesscycles is not
possible, but I shall attempt to summarize the leadingideas of rep-
resentative students. Aside from incidentalcomment, such criticism
and confirmation as emerge from this studyarc presented at later
points.
MiTCHELL ON THE ROLE OF STOCKS
Characteristically, Mitchell develops his ideas aboutinventories as
part of his description of how the events thatoccur during a con-
traction of business lead to revival; how revivalleads to expansion,
and so through the cycle. During cyclicalcontractions, he writes,
"Merchants require smaller stocks andcut their orders more than
sales fall off. A similar policy is followed byother enterprises. Thus
the reduction in volume of trade is amplifiedstage by stage as it
travels back through wholesale dealers tomanufacturers and pro-
ducers of raw materials."5
The reduction of stocks helps to intensifycontraction, but it has
its limits. When stocks have been reducedas far as they safely can
be, goods must be replacedas rapidly as they are sold. This bolsters
the demand for goods, andmay actually cause merchants' orders
and manufacturers' purchases and productionto increase.
"First, the accumulated stocks of goodscarried over from thepre-
ceding period of prosperityare gradually disposed of. Even when
current consumption is small, manufacturers and merchantscanre-
duce their stocks of raw materials and finishedwares by filling orders
chiefly from what is on hand and confiningpurchases to the small
quantities needed to keepfullassortments. But when the stocks have
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once been reduced to the smallest dimensionsallowed by theregular filling of orders, then currentpurchases andcurrent productionare perforce increased, even thoughcurrent consumptiondocs notgrow larger."8
The necessity of halting,or at least retarding, the
liquidation of stocks is thusone of the factors that, in Mitchell'sopinion, helpto bring the depressionto an end. And onceoutput and salesbegin to increase, businessmen feelthe need for largerstocks tosupport their larger activity. Theirpurchases andoutput, therefore,tend to in- crease more than their sales,adding momentumto the expansion. The incentive to buildup stocks, moreover,comes not only fromin- creasing activity butalso from rising priceswhen theseare thought to be an omen of furtherincreases.
[Businessmen} "becomeeager to lay in largestocks or tomake long contracts while quotationsare still moderate andterms are stilleasy. Thus the anticipationof futureadvances in pricesnot onlyprevents present advances fromreducing demand,but actuallymakes demand grow in the face ofa rising level of prices."7
As activityincreases andprosperity becomesmore general, the balanced growthof stocks andproduction isupset. Formany reasons prices tendto weaken afterthe upwardphase haspro- ceeded forsome time. Businessmenattempt to maintainprices by keeping goodsoff the marketand permittingcurrent outputto pile up. This policy,however, meetsits own specialobstacles andcan, in anycase, be asource of merelytemporary relief.Whenprosper- ity ison the wane theattempt tostave off declinesin prices by stockpilingcurrent outputmust eventuallyfail. Theliquidation of the undulylarge inventoriesduring theensuingdepression intensi- fies thesubsequentcontraction.
"High discountrates also impedethe efforts,often madetoward the end ofa prosperousperiod, tomaintain sellingprices by keeping goods off themarket andallowingcurrent outputto pile up in huge stocks, whichare held forsale ata moreopportunemoment.... A temporary relieffrom athreatened fallof pricesmay be obtained in this way,but thepotential dangerbecomesmore grave. Theheavy
interestcost of 'carrying'
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of even the largest enterprises and makes long persistence in this
course hazardous. If buyers get wind of the situation, they hold off
for the drop in prices they expect will come when the stocksare finally
'sacrificed'. In short, there can be but one end to sucha policy when
initiated under the business conditions of waning prosperity, and that
disastrous end is hastened by high discount rates."8
'OVERPRODUCTION' THEORIES
In Mitchell's analysis of the forces involved in business cycles,
stocks are an auxiliary factor, one ofmany causes accounting for
the cumulation of pro6perity and depression and for the transition
from expansion to contraction. Other explanations assigna more
crucial role to inventories. One, put forward by the so-called 'over-
production' theorists, is summarized by R. G. Hawtrey:
"The classical economists argued that general overproductionwas
impossible, because no one produced except witha view to consuisi-
ing, and therefore demand was necessarily equalto supply. Moreover,
production was at its greatest during the active phase of thetrade
cycle, and fell off during the phase of depression, at thevery time
when the symptoms of overproduction appeared. These difficulties
could be met if the overproduction were supposed to take the form of
accumulation of excessive stocks of commodities. If productionOut-
strips demand, it was said, a part of the products remains unsold, and
traders, encumbered with unsold goods, become reluctant to produce
more. Restricted production means a restricted employment. These
conditions will continue so long as unsold stocks remain abovenor-
mal. The redundant goods have to be sold off at a sacrifice of price.
When that process is completed, traders' stocks will have been brought
into relation with a reduced scale of production and consumption.
The pressure on markets being then relieved, there is found to bea
margin of unemployed capital and labour, anxious to start producing.
When production revives, the existing stocks of commoditiesare
found to be insufficient for the needs of markets, and theprocess of
replenishing stocks makes for active production. Production in fact,
exceeds consumption, and will continue to do so till excessive stocks
have again been accumulated, and the cycle is then started afresh."9
To account for excessive stocks two explanations are offered.
* Thid., p. 59.
'Trade and Credit (Longmans, Green, 1928), pp. 84-5. The term 'traders',
a, used by Mr. Hawtrey, includes manufacturers as well as merchants.First, the attempt to replenish stocksas well as to meet
current. mand is said to lead to the construCtionof newcapacity. i)ur this jeconSUmiflgprocess stocks remain inadequate;
COI1Sfl'l,lc. tim is, therefore, likely to be overdone.Secondly,a periodof ac- tivity gives rise to optimisticexpectations whichinducebusjn. men to make larger commitmentsin plant andinvcntozj actual markets willwarrant. As Hawtreyputs it (p. 85): "At the end, therefore, ofa time of depression, theperiod of eq would be prolonged duringthe process ofextending theequip. ment of industry. Theclimax wouldcome when thefreshcapitaj came into use, and the swollenoutput of consumable
commcjdjjp would increase stocksup to normal and thereafterwouldexceed de. mand."
It seems consistentwith these viewsto expect thatinventori will rise and falltogether with businessactivity but thataccumula- tions as measured,say, by the ratio ofstocks tooutput or saks,will be excessiveonly toward theend of expansions.Similarly,deficient inventories wouldbe expected towardthe end ofcontractions.
HAWTRZY'STHEORY
Although thisconvenientsummary of theoverproductiontheory was taken fromone of Hawtrcy'sbooks he, ofcourse, holds quite different views.His name is,indeed, associatedprimarily withthe idea that thetrade cycleis a 'purelymonetaryphenomenon'. But while becontends thatthe essentialfeature ofbusiness cyclesis an expansion andcontraction ofthemoney supply,the vehicleon which theadditionalmoney is broughtto the publicand later takenaway is the inventorypolicy ofbusinessmen.'0 Hawtreybelieves thateasy creditconditions andlow interest rates arean incentiveto merchantsto borrow inorder to holdbig- ger stocks. Their
increased orders,financed bynew credit, stimu- late productionand employmentand leadto largerincomes and consumer expenditures.These inturn causebusinessmento seek still largerstocks tosupport theirgrowingbusiness. Thusthe forces making forbusinessexpansioncumulate. Andwhile theinitial im-
pulses toaugment stockscome firstfromeasy creditterms, then
from biggersales, theygainstrength, laterin theexpansion, from
o See
especially hisCurrencyand Credit(Longrnans,Green, !950), Ch.































rising prices. The period of increasing activity is brought to an end
because, as incomes rise, the banking system tends to lose cash both
to foreign countries and to the domestic circulation. Thedepletion
of reserve cash causes a rise in interest rates and a restriction in
bank loans. Merchants then try to liquidate stocks, and smaller
orders set in motion the mutually reinforcing procees of con-
traction.
This version of Hawtrey's theory is well known. Perhaps less ap-
preciated than it ought to be is that Hawtrey's explanation of busi-
ness cycles rests on a virtual, not on an actual, cycle ofinventories.
That is, under the impulse given by low interest rates, merchants
attempt to build up stocks by placing larger orders. But since the
employment and income thereby created stimulate consumer ex-
penditures, the first effect is bigger sales of finished goods. Thus
larger stocks of goods in process are offset by depleted stocks of
finished goods. Hawtrey sometimes writes as if the net result were
to cause total stocks to rise but by less than the desired amount,
leading to a still further increase of orders and output.11 At other
times he seems to contend that the depletion of inventories of fin-
ished goods entirely offsets the growth of goods in process so that
business stocks as a whole actually remain constant (pp. 156, 157):
"Increased working capital, in the form of goods in course of pro-
duction, is provided [during expansion] not by a 'windfall' conferred
on producers through a rise in prices, but by supplies of money, which
enable consumers to draw on the finished products in stock.
Goods previously idle pass into consumption, and arc replaced for
the time being as an item of working capital by goods in the course of
manufactures. The total of working capital in the entire community
remains unchanged, and therefore becomes less in proportion to pro-
duction, but the shortage of working capital is felt only in the stocks
of finished products, which can be varied within fairly wide limits
without inconvenience. The shortage of finished productsisa direct
stimulus to increased activity. If it goes too far and threatens e.xhaus-
tion of supplies in the face of a continued demand, dealers defend
themselves by raising prices to the consumer above replacement
value."
The significance of these passages is clear on one point. The ac-
tual change in stocks is not, in Hawtrey's view, the effective pro-
11 Trcda and Crsdit, p. 9!.
'3pdllant and may, indeed, not be very large. The operativeforce
thedesireto increase or decrease inventories and theconsequt
larger or smaller orders.
How Hawtrey thinks stocks behave is less easilysaid. Dears'
stocks may rise or fall during expansions.Manufacturers'stocks of
goods in process must of course rise, but their suppliesof purchad
raw materials or finished goods may fall. One featureimplicit in
Hawtrey's theory, however, seems to requiretotal inventoriesas
distinct from individual categories,to rise during expansionsand
fall during contractions. Since Hawtreycontends thatattempts to
increase stocks will result ingreater employment andincome only if there is a net expansion of bankcredit, the largerliabilities of borrowers must be balancedsomewhere in theiraccounts by addi-
tional capital assets. Thesenew assets may take the formof plantor equipment, but in the context ofHawtrey'sargument, it is more
reasonable to think of themas commodity stocks.
KEYNES' THEORY OFWORICING AND LIQUID CAPITAL
Of the inventory theoriesproposed by leading writeis on busm
cycles, J. M. Keynes'are perhaps the best developedand possibly the most penetrating.'2It may be worth whileto review at least the broad features ofKeynes' treatment.More details willbe noted in later chapters. Forpurposes of analysis andexposition, Keynes divides all inventoriesinto twocategories, "working"and "liquid" capital. He definesworking capitalas "the aggregate ofgoods... in course ofproduction, manufacture,transport and retailing, in- chiding suchminimum stocks,whether ofraw materialsor of fin- ished products,as are requiredto avoid risks ofinterruption of process or to tideover seasonalirregulai-jtjes (e.g.,intervals be- tween harvestsor fluctuations ofindividual harvestsabout the mean) ... [Working capital] includes
without distinctiongoods in process,such as foodor textiles.
. the consumption of which will be spreadover a short time,and goods inprocess...which willemerge as fixedcapital, theconsumption of whichmust be spread overa period, andarc not immediatelyavailahJe." 'freagjon Money, I, Ch.i8 and II, Ci,.
-9. Gene01 Theory of Em Ployment, lnlerejtand MoneyCh. 22(Harcou,t Brace,1Q30 and 1936).
ITreajon Money, 11,r t6. Keynes defines
goods in processmore broadly
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Liquid capital, in contrast, is definedas surplus stocks, that is,
stocks over and above the goodsnecessary to carry on a given vol-
ulne of production and distribution.
In practice, however, working and liquid capitalcannot be
clearly differentiated. Goods actually passing througha specific
process of fabrication (hides in the tanning vat, for example) are
objectively related to the rate of production. But how largea sup-
ply of purchased raw materials does a manufacturer require to sup-
port a given output? Though Keynes was, of course, notunaware
of the difficulty, he merely says (I,129):"normal stocks required
for efficient business are part of working capital and therefore in
process, whilst surplus stocks are to be regarded as liquid".
With these definitions in hand, Keynes is ableto draw his picture
of the cyclical behavior of inventories ndto show its significance.
Working capital, since it represents goods inprocess and other in-
ventories 'required' to support production and distribution,must,
as a matter of definition, fluctuate together with output and
roughly in the same proportion. More important,as Keynes later
argues, it comprises the bulk of inventories, so that itsmovements
dominate the behavior of inventoriesas a whole.
Keynes develops his views on liquid capital in rebuttingHaw-
trey's argument about the behavior of stocks. Keynestakes the
position, contrary to Hawtrey, that fluctuationsin liquid capital
can no more than partly offset fluctuations in working capital. In
support of this view, he advances three arguments.
i) During slumps production falls offmuch more sharply than
consumption. And since the evidence doesnot suggest that the ex-
cess consumption is fully balanced by diminished investment in
fixed capital, stocks must become somewhatdepleted. Hence the
liquidation of working capital must exceedany accumulation of
liquid capital.
2)An investigation into the volume of stocksat different dates
leads Keynes to think that the true surplusstocks of liquid capital
in existence at any timeare too small to offset the cyclical move-
ments of working capital.
In addition, Keynes writes (II, 134,135):
the figures corroborate the expectationthat [in the case ofa





Isive iflVcStmCt in fxeJ tapital) stockstend to attain their
maximum in an early phase of the slump andarc at a low point whenthe im. provement of trade is definitely bcginning....Thisconfirmsexpec. tion because, when the slumpbegins, thc falling offof production does not show itself immediatelyat the finishing end ofthe machine of process, whilst it does showitself immediately inthe amountwhich is being fed back into the monthof the machine:so liquid stocksin. crease. Later on, however, the diminishedproduction resultsin di- minished availableoutput, whilst currentconsumption doesnot fall off so muchas does productionwith the resultthat therecan be no increase of liquid stocks, butrather the contrary."
3)The costs of carryingsurplus stocks, includingthe risk of lossdue to price drops,are very high. Hence ifsuch stockscome into ex- istence, they force theirown reabsorption bycausing pricesto fall and productionto be restricted."Recoverybroadlyspeaking cannot begin until [surplus]stocks have beenabsorbed.. ." (II, 145). Consequently,the liquidation ofworking capitalcharacter- izing a slumpmust eventually bereinforced, notoffset, bya liqui- dation of surplusstocks. Keynestherefore concludes,contrary to Hawtrey, thatsurplus stocks,having beenworked off duringthe stump, cannotcounteract the accumulationof workingcapital in the ensuingrecovery, except perhapsin itsvery earliest stages. These variousconsiderations leadKeynes toa general view about the behaviorof stocksas a whole, workingcapital and liquid capital together(General Theory,p. 319): "In the earliestphase ofa typical slumpthere willprobably bean investment inincreasing [surplus]stocks whichhelps to offsetdisin- vestment in workingcapital; in thenext phase theremay be a short period ofdisinvestment bothin [surplus]stocks and inworking capi- tal; after thelowest pointhas beenpassed there islikely to bea fur- ther disinvestmentin [surplus]stocks whichpartially offsetsreinvest- ment in workingcapital; andfinally, afterthe recoveryis vcll on its way, both factorswill besimultaneouslyfavorable toinvestment." A reviewof thestatisticson manufacturers'stocks will demon- strate howdiscerning thispassage is.Meanwhile, takingKeynes' argument at facevalue,we may asksome questions.Working cap- ital increaseswithoutput, butwhen doesthe rate ofinvestment, that is, therate of growthin workingcapital reachits peak? At thesame timeas outputor earlier?Surplusstocks are supposedtoSETFING AND SCOPE 17
increase both before and after the peak of the cycle. When do they
grow most rapidly? Before or after the peak? Similar questions re-
main to puzzle us about the course and mechanism of the slump.
Keynes supplements his theory about the behavior of stocks with
arguments about the size and significance of inventories and their
fluctuations and their relation to the length of cyclical expansions
and contractions. On the basis of some rough estimates he con-
cludes that the impairment of working capital in a severe decline
such as 1920-22 was probably about 15 percent or £250 milliOn
sterling.14 Since he takes this sum to be equal to approximately half
of a year's savings in Great Britain in a normal year, and since he
considers that fluctuations in liquid capital can offset those in
working capital to only a small extent, Keynes is able to satisfy
himself about a number of interesting points.
Fixst, the fluctuations in working capital that inevitably accom- S
pany fluctuations in demand and output are an important intensi-
fying if not initiating factor, tending to reinforce movements of
demand in either direction. In the language of the Treatire on
Money (II, 116): "It is evident that fluctuations in the amount
of Working Capital are so large that they can, on occasion, be an
important factor in bringing about a disequilibrium between the
rates of Saving and Investment." Thus if for any reason manufac-
turers receive larger orders, their attempt to fill them entails ad-
ditional working capital which in turn increases incomes and pre-
sumably the demand for goods even before the original orders can
be filled. The effect of this process, Keynes thinks, must be a rise in
prices relative to costs, thereby giving businessmen a further incen-
tive to invest (I,Ch. i8).
So strong, indeed, does Keynes consider the impact of invest-
ment in working capital on prices that he suggests it may deter-
mine the pace and average length of cyclical expansions and con-
tractions. For if there is an attempt to raise the rate of employment
too rapidly, the necessary investment in working capital will be so
large as to cause a severe inflation in the prices of consumer goods,
and presumably of the materials that enter into them.
14 The bail, of Keynes' calculations is admittedly unsatisfactory, but there
is better evidence now to demonstrate that cyclical changes in inventory
investment are relatively large (see Table i above)."When, therefore, the timecojucs fur the replenishment of
working capital, it may be impossible to effectthis rapidly withoutrupturing the equilibrium of prices andincomes. Even if appropriatesteps are taken in good time, twoyears or more may elapse before
working capital can be restored; and if suchsteps are not taken,a longer in- terval may be required."5
Finally, just as his theory aboutworking capitalexplains for Keynes the relatively moderatepace of expansion, his theoryabout liquid capital accounts forthe relatively swiftpace of contraction.
The essence of his viewis that the speculativerisks of holdingsur- plus inventories, addedto the burdens of deterioration,
warehous- ing, insurance, andinterest, make thecost of carryingredundant stocks very high. Asa consequence, when surplusstocksaccumu- late at the beginningof a slump, theirholders will themselvescur- tail production, ifthey can, in orderto liquidate the stocksprompt- ly; if they cannot, theirattempts to sell will forceprices downdras.. tically, therebybringing a sharpreduction in output.'°Ofcourse, the curtailmentof output will itselfreduce demandand retardthe rate of inventoryabsorption, necessitatingstill furtherrestriction of output andso on cumulatively,at least fora time. Hence the violence ofcontraction.
Keynes is lessclear concerningthe length ofthe process. Inthe Treatise on Moneyhe confineshimself to examplescovering single commodities. Inthe GeneralTheory, howcver,he suggeststwo factors that controlthe length ofdepressions(p. 3 8). The firstis "the averagedurability of capitalin a givenepoch". "The secondstable time-factoris dueto the carrying-costsof sur- plus stocks whichforce theirabsorption withina certain period, neithervery short norvery long. Thesudden cessationof new invt- rnent after thecrisis willprobably leadto an accumulationof surplus stocks ofunfinished goods.Thecarrying-costs ofthese stocks willsel- dom be lessthan topercent perannum. Thus thefall in their price Treatiseon Money, II,i 12-3. In this
connection Keynescites Mitchell's
1953calculations thatthe meanlength ofan expansion isjust underIwo
years and themaximum aboutthree years. 16 Ibid.,II, 146."Just as theimprovement inthe volume ofproduction Can
take placeonly gradually,owing to thetime whichit takes to buildup
Working Capitalagain; somust the fallingoff in thevolume of production
take placesuddenly, whenthere issurplus LiquidCapital, owingto the
short timewithin whichLiquid Capitalmust be absorbed,"
i8
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needs to be sufficient to bring about arestriction which provides for
their absorption within a period of, say,three to five years at the out-
side. Now the process of absorbingthe stocks represents negative in-
vestment, which is a furtherdeterrent to employment; and,when it
is over, a manifest relief willbe experienced."
Keynes' suggestion of a three to five yearperiod is significant.
As we shall see, the recordlends some support to his pictureof the
behavior of surplus stocks duringcontractions of this length. On
the other hand, contractionsthat persist for as long as three years
are ratherexceptional.'1 In shorter depressions, stockshave not
behaved in accordance with Keynes'hypothesis. For these shorter
episodes the mechanism ofcontraction and recovery must bedif-
ferent from the one Keynessketches.
THE ACCELERATIONPRINCIPLE AND THE PATTERN OFINVENTORY
INVESTMENT
The theories reviewed abovehave at least one thing in common.
Either implicitly or explicitlyall rely upon changes in the rateof
inventory investment toexplain at least part of the impactof in-
ventories on business cycles.But the descriptions of thebehavior
of stocks run exclusively in termsof level, not of rate of growth.It
is clear, however, thatthe peaks and troughs of inventoryinvest-
ment may, and ingeneral will, precede the peaksand troughs of
stocks themselves.1' Thenumber employcd in producinggoods
destined for stock may,therefore, be declining whileinventories
themselves are still rising.If we treat inventory investmentin a
fashion strictly parallelwith investment in durablegoods, we
would say that inventories areexercising a depressing influence on
employment when the rateof inventory investmentdeclines, not
when inventories begin tobe liquidated. It is,therefore, of first
17The National Bureauchronology of monthly businesscycles records i6
contractions in Great Britain and21in the United States between1857 and
1938. Of these, only 4 Britishand 3 United States contractionslasted as long
asyears.Even contractions of2years are in the minority:there have
been only 6 in Great Britainand 5 in the United Statessince 1857. See
Measuring Business Cycles, Tablei6, pp. 78-9.
18This, of course, is not necessary.If the rate of growth ofstocks increased
until the peak of an inventorycycle was reached, inventoriesand inventOry
investment would turn downsiniultaneously.CHAPTER ONE 20
importance to have a well founded idea about thecyclical be-
havior of inventory investmentas distinct from the level ofstocks
themselves.
One suggestion consists in applying thewell knownprinciple
of the magnification and accelerationof derived demandto the
accumulation and liquidation of stocks.Although thisprinciple, derived from the hypothcsis thatthe rate of netnew investment is controlled by the rate of changein, not the level of,demand for
consumer goods, has been studied largelyin connectionwith in. vestment in producer durableequipment, its applicationto inven- tories was recognized byJ. M. Clark in his initialtreatment in J9719
Kuznets stressed this applicationin his study ofcycles in the merchandising tradesand in a later generalcritique of the acceleration principle.20
In its simplest formthe principleassumes that manufacturers
and merchantsare both desirous and ableto maintaininventories in constant ratioto their outputor sales. Inventorieswould vary directly and proportionatelywith salesor output, but therate of inventory investmentwould vary directlywith the rate ofchange in sales, and itsmagnitude wouldbear thesame relation to the magnitude of thechange in salesas stocks themselvesbear to saks. Hence if amanufacturer keptinventories fourtimes his monthly sales, a $1,000increase in hismonthly saleswould call foran in- ventory investment of$4,000.
An arithmeticalexample will makethese relationsclearer. It as- suines that the desired
inventory-sales ratiois.j toand that if the rate of sales changes,the firm willbe able, bypurchases oroutput, to restore inventoriesto the desiredratio by theend of the month in which thechangeoccurs. Table2 illustrates severalleading propositions thattogethermay be saidto constitutethe principle of themagnification andacceleration ofderived demandas ap- plied to inventoryinvestment:
19 BusinessAcceleration andthe Law ofDemand: ATechnical Factor in Economic Cycles,Journal ofPolitical Economy,March 3917,pp. 237-35.
20 Cyclic..!
Fluctuations; Retailand WholesaleTrade, UnitedStates, :919-
1925 (Adelphi,ig.6), and theRelation BctweenCapital Goodsand Fin-
ished Productsin thBusiness Cycle,Economic Essaysin Honor ofWesley
Clair Mitchell(CohinbiaUniversity Press,'935). Sec alsoGottfried Haber
lee, Prospentyand Depression



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ii) Inventory investment varies directly andProportionately wi
the rate of change in sales, not with sales proper.Although ir
example sales continue to rise through the fifthmonth, theirra
of increase and inventory investment fall after thethird. Aftert
peak, sales decline until the tenth month, but theirrate of dcd
and inventory investment reach troughs in the ninth.
2) Inventory investment equals the absolutechange in salesmuj.
tiplied by the inventory-sales ratio.
) Total business expenditures followa pattern that isa com-
pound of the patterns of expendituresto replace salesand th
required for inventory investment. Usuallythey willreach theft peaks and troughs later thanexpenditures for invcntoin'.
Inent but before expenditures forreplacements. Thusinentory investment reaches its peak inthe third month,total Cxpenditures in the fourth, and replacementexpenditures in the fifth.
4) The absolute amplitude of thefluctuation in total busi ex- penditures is a compound alsoof the amplitudes ofthe fluctuation in sales and of the muchwider fluctuation ininventory investment As a result, its relativeamplitude is wider thanthat in sales.
These propositionsexpress the principle ofacceleration and magnilicaijon in itssimplest form. Clark,Kuznets, and other writers stress certainquaJificatioand extensions ofthe theory. In particuJ, theyrecognize that inventorysalesratios are not rigid. On theone hand, expenditures forboth replacementand in- ventory investmentare likely to lag,creating a tendcnc'to reduce both the leadand magnitudeof investmentcycles relativeto sales. On the otherhand, the lagscreate initial shortagesrelative to de- mand whichcause prices to rise,with the resultthat inventory in- vestments motivated byprice speculationare likely to overlie thce motivated by changesin sales. Inaddition, Clarkemphasizes that the causalsequence does notrun simply fromfinal demandto de. mand for investmentgoods, but alsofrom investment,via the con- sumer incomescreated, toconsumer expendituresEach type of demand reinlorcesthe othersand modifiesits pattern ina procc of adaptationthat at firstmagnifies theinitial impulse,but is, in the end,sell-limiting andself..revers;ngai
21Cf. CIark'Additional Noteon BusjAcceleration and theLaw of De- mand, Prefaceto SocidEconomics (Farra.& Rinehart,1936), pp.3495SETTING AND SCOPE 23
HANSEN'S THEORY OF THE ROLE OF INVENTORIES IN LONG AND
SHORT CYCLES
An important problem with respect to the role of inventories in
business cycles had been raised by Alvin H. Hansen. In his Fiscal
Policy and Business Cycles22 he substantially accepts Schumpeter's
theory that several business cycle types may be distinguished:
among them, long waves of approximately 50 years, "major"
cycles of about 8 years, and "minor" fluctuations most of which
last 3 or 4 years. Hansen, like Schumpeter, attributes the long
waves and the major cycles to fluctuations in investment activity
in durable equipment and construction work, connected with un-
portant economic innovations. He attributes the minor cycles,
however, primarily to fluctuations in inventory investment.
In Hansen's view the ebb and flow of inventories not merely
"dominates the so-called minor cycle"; he contends also that in-
ventory investment is an important stimulus to revival after major
depressions. In the period covered by the national product data to
which he refers, there were two such depressions, 1920-21 and
1929-32. The improvement in business from 1921 to 1922 was
accompanied by an increase in inventory accumulation; that from
1932 to i933 was accompanied by a sharp decline in inventory
liquidation. Both, of course, helped to raise the level of busine.
Hansen concludes (p. 60) that "inventory investment plays con-
sistently an important role in the initiation of revival".
Professor Hansen's theories may prove important leads toward
an understanding of business cycles. The influence of inventory in-
vestment in long and short cycles and its role in initiating revivals
and recessions are studied below in the introduction to Part Three,
and in Chapters I4and2I.
METZLER'S THEORY OF SELF-GENERATING INVENTORY CYCLES
The idea that the short business cycle is to be attributed mainly to
fluctuations in inventory investment has been developed further
by Lloyd A. Metzler.21 He has formulated a theory of short cycles
22 (Norton, 1941). Professor Hansen emphasized also the importance of a
cycle in building construction with an average period of 17 to i8 years.
21Nat,jand Stability of Inventory Cydes, Review of Economic Statistics,
Aug. and Business Cycles and the Modern Theory of Employment,
American Economic Review, June 1946.24 CI{APTEM ONI
on the simplifyingassumption that the sole effects of a change
lit
income are certain adaptive responsesin inventoryinvestment to-
gether with the secondary changesin incomes andconsumer.
penditures caused by business outlays to increase stocks.
Metzler bases his theory on two hypotheses:
z) The economic system is essentially stable, though subjectto
more or less regular oscillations. The oscillations are marked by
cycles of investment, income, and expenditure induced by im.
pulses that may originate in preceding phases or may be of inde-
pendent otigin (such as the commercial application of anew.
vention). The cycles are, however, self-limiting and self-reversing
fluctuations about an equilibrium level.24
2) Oscillations of income about its equilibrium levelmay consist
of several cycles reflecting the response of various activitiesto the
same impulse or impulses. Individual cycles are attributedto in.
duced demands for consumer or producer durablegoods, to the
demand for housing and for inventories. Othercyclical respo
are, of course, possible. Each presumably has special featurrof
its own that in isolation would give riseto business cycles with
characteristic amplitudes and durations. Inpractice, of course, the
several cycles impinge upon and modifyone another, producing
the complex business cycles ofexperience.25
Metzler's articlesare directed to the theory of inventory cyd,
that is, to the character of thegeneral business cycles that would
be generated by theresponse of inventory investmentto a change
in income. His generalpicture of events duringan inventory cycle
runs as follows:
i) The first effect ofan increase in income andexpenditures is a





decline in inventories because producers arc unable to expand
output rapidly enough.
Thereafter production is increased both to meet the bigger de-
mand and to replenish inventories and build them up in conso-
nance with the larger output.
As output is stepped up, demand also rises and stocks remain
abnormally low, despite efforts to increase them. Nevertheless,
since consumers do not spend all their augmented incomes, stocks
do increase to some extent.
Eventually incomes rise to a level consistent with the rate of
non-induced investment (investment, that is, not sustained by the
cyclical increase of incomes). They do not stop at this level, how-
ever, since inventories are still low relative to the rate of activity.
Inventory investment, therefore, pushes incomes still higher.
) Metzler describes the reversal of business activity as follows
(American Economic Review, June 1946, p. 288):
'Once the level of income has risen above its new equilibrium, a
subsequent decline is inevitable. The inflated level of income is sus-
tained and increased only by investment in inventories, and such in-
vestment cannot be continued indefinitely. As income rises, inven-
tories also rise, and this process continues until a normal relation be-
tween inventories and expected sales is established. Thereafter, busi-
ness men plan no further increases in stocks; they attempt,instead,
to produce only what they expect to sell. Since production plans in
earlier periods included production for stocks as well as for sale, the
decision to produce only for sale means an absolute decline in total
output. As a result, income in the hands of consumers declines, sales
are reduced, and a period of general contractiondevelops. The con-
traction is accelerated by the fact that sales fall below expectations,
since this causes inventories to become abnormally large and business
men therefore reduce output stillfurther in an attempt to restore their
stocks to a normal level."
From this point forward, Metzler's description of contraction
and revival is symmetrical with the description of expansion and
recession set forth above. In the absence of further disturbances
from outside the system of business responses or adaptations, Metz-
Icr expects that developments in contraction will lead to another
revival, and so on around. But he thinks subsequent cycles will
be highly damped.
25Metzler's model is interesting because it presents not onlya
modern theory of business cycles in which inventories playa lead.
ing role but also a fairly definite hypothesis about the cyclical t,.
havior of inventories that may be tested. Metzler assumesthat
stocks act in the following fashion:
i) Inventories rise after the peak of business and begin to fallonly
some time after contraction has started; they continue to fall after
busine&s has reached its trough and begin to rise onlysome time
after expansion is under way.
The rate of inventory accumulation reachesa peak near the
peak of business and a trough near the trough of business.It is not
clear, however, whether the intended investment justpreceding
the peak is larger or smaller than the unintendedinvestment un-
mediately following it. Nor is it clear whethera period of low in-
vestment intervenes between the intended investmentsof late ex-
pansion and the unintended accumulationsof early contraction.
Similar remarks might be made about thecyclical trough.
The inventory-output (or inventory-sales)ratio must fall im-
mediately after business beginsto revive. Thereafter itmay con-
tinue to fall or reverse itscourse. Toward the end of expansion,
however, it must be rising, for Metzlerholds that planned inven-
tory investment reachesa peak when a 'normal' relationbetween
inventories and sales isestablished. Since the first effectof ex-
pansion is to establishan abnormally low ratio (sales increasewhile
inventories fall), the ratiomust start to rise later andcontinue to rise until the end ofexpansion. In contractionthe expected de-
velopment is symmetricalbut opposite.
BLODCETT'S ANALYSISOF THE EVIDENCE
To my knowledge,the onlysystematic empirical study ofcycles in the stocks ofAmerican manufacturersis Ralnk !l. Blodgett's
Cyclical Fluctuationsin CommodityStoc/j (Universityo Penn- sylvania Press,ig). In his valuableponeer work, Blodgett ex- amined a considerablepart of the materialused in this report and, indeed, analyzedhis data bymeans of the National Bureaumeas- ures of cyclical behavior.My material,however, differs from Blodgett's inseveral respects. Idiscarded a few ofthe series Blod- gett studied becausethey includedinventories held bynonmanu-
I
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facturers in too great a degree, because they were deemed insuffi-
ciently reliable, or because they covered too short a time span.
Many of Blodgett's other series, which I too studied, are now
available for a longer period than when he wrote. Finally, I had
the advantage of a considerably larger body of data, in particular
the estimates based on corporation balance sheets, the only com-
prehensive data on manufacturers' inventories as a whole.
Despite these differences in data, Blodgett anticipated the re-
sults of this study in certain notable instances. For example, he
concluded that, while stocks of finished staple goods held by
manufacturers normally increase during business contractions and
decline during expansions, this inverted movement is reversed in
the course of long and severe contractions, and stocks tend to de-
dine together with business activity.26 This and certain other de-
tailed instances of agreement and disagreement between Blodgett's
findings and my own are noted at various points below. Here the
important thing to record is Blodgett's general conclusion about
the cyclical behavior of manufacturers' stocks (p. I 04):
"Some of the stocks of finished commodities and materials held at
the producers'. .. are positive in their cyclical movements, while
others are inverted. These two groups of stocks appear to be quite
equal in so far as numbers are concerned. When it is remembered,
however, that the stocks of the inverted type are very much larger
than the stocks of the positive type, on the average, and are much
more active cyclically, the necessary conclusion is that stocks of fin-
ished commodities and materials at the producers' of the finished
products show a net tendency toward inverted cyclical behavior in re-
lation to the reference cycles of general business."
Now this statement, by itself, is rather seriously at variance with
my conclusions, which, as we shall see, are that cycles in inanu-
facturers' stocks as a whole tend to conform positively to cycles
in business activity at large, though with a lag perhaps as long as
9 months. It is well, however, not to overstress the difference be-
tween our conclusions. At least a substantial minority of business
cycle phases are no longer than i8 months, so that if stocks lag
21Op. cit., pp. 53, 54. Blodgett does not present empirical support for the
conclusion that this class of stocks acts differently in long and short phases.
It is, however, essentially correct, as will be seen below; and is true for ex-
pansions as well as contractions.28
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as much as 9 months, they move counter to busmess activity
fora
major portion of these short phases, though not fortheir cntjr
length, as Blodgett implies. Among American buhi
cycles since
1855,4 of 2! expansions and 13 of 2! Contractions did not
i 8 month&z? Add to this Blodgett's belief that positive
COnJom
may be expected in long severe contractions, and itwill be
that our findings, though different,are not wholly dip.jj
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THELITERATURE
This review of earlier work sufficesto suggest the majorideas ad- vanced and to illustrate the startlingdifferencesamong econ.
omists' notions about inventory behavior.From Mitchell'sSuggj.
tion that stocks move in roughpositive conformitywith bujj,
activity to Hawtrcy's theory thatcycles in stocks offinished goods and of goods in processare approximately offsetting,to Blodget finding that manufacturers'stocks as a wholenormally vary in- versely to business activity,one traverses almost theentire range of possible hypothesesabout inventory behavior.Meanwhj, with the nota!jle exceptionsof Clark and Metzler,singularly littieat- tempt has been madeto state precisely howinventory investn acts. Yet from the standpointof the impact ofinventories on busi- ness cycles, investmentcounts more than the levelof inventories. There is anotherprominent characteristicof the literature: all the ideas aboutinventory behaviorreviewed aboveexcqx Blodgett'sare exceedingly simpleand general.Distinctjopj are few; insome cases thesame behavior is implicitlyattributed to the stocks of bothmerchants andmanufacturers In othersthe divi- sions are broadindeed: betwworking and liquidcapital or between finishedgoods and goods inprocess. A review of the evi- dence onmanufacturers' holdings,however, indicatesthat such simple theorieswill not do.The behaviorof manufacturers'stocks is acompound of thediverse behaviorof many classesof stocks. The literatureexhibits a strikingvariety of views inother ways. Withrespect to the forces
Controlling stocks,Hawtrcy stresses the influence ofinterestcosts. Clark andother writers whodepend upon the acceleri0
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assign some regular, significant influence to price expectations,
among other causes. The 'overproduction' theorists inearlier times
and Keynes more recently held that stocks are redundant at some
stages in cycles, deficient at others because changes in production
do not keep pace with changes in sales to ultimate consumers.
Finally, turning to the impact of inventories on business, we find
a number of intriguingsuggestions. There is general agreement
that stocks influence business cycles chiefly through changes in the
expenditures businessmen make with the purpose of increasing
their inventories, that is, through changes in the amount of invest-
mesit planned per time period. So if the magnitude andtiming of
such planned expenditures relative to other actions by business-
men and consumers can be determined, weshould be in a posi-
tion to state how inventories make their influence felt and how
strong that influence is. On these questions, however, earlierwrit-
ers are in disagreement. Clark suggests thatplanned inventory in-
vestment rises, generating an expansion in business, as long as sales
and output grow at an increasing rate; thereafter it begins to
drop, tending to depress business. In contraction the rate of
planned investment falls (or liquidation increases) as long as sales
drop at an increasing rate. In this stage inventory investment has a
depressing influence, but when the decline in sales is retarded, the
rate of liquidation also is reduced, which spurs businessactivity.28
Keynes holds that inventory policy influences the severity and
duration of contractions in a special way. He begins with the idea
that contractions open with an undesired accumulation of stocks
because business is unable to reduce output as fast as sales fall off.
The attempt to liquidate these redundant stocks causes a precipi-
11 tate drop in orders and output. And since this in turn causesin-
comes and, therefore, sales to fall, the periodof liquidation is neces-
sarily protracted, requiring, in Keynes' opinion, from 3 to 5 years.
Hansen advances the idea that business cycles differ in the im-
portance of fluctuations in inventory investment ascausal factors.
He distinguishes a relatively long cycle, of about to years, which he
attributes to a wave of investment in durable goods and construc-
This is an unduly simplified version of Clark's position since he allows for
business forecasts of changes in sales and in prices and for the time it takes
to execute decisions and translate them into actual outlays.30 CHAPTER O,,
tion. In the course of the upswing of such eqllipmelitcycles, l.
ever, he believes that inventories from time to time become
sen.
ously out of balance with sales and output. Businesscontracti
then develop owing to sharp reductions in inventoryinvestmt
In Hansen's view, therefore, the upswings of relativelylong cycla
are broken into shorter cycles durmg whichcontractiop of inwj.
ment in plant and equipment are small. Consequently,
chartga
in output during short cycles largely takethe form ofchaiigãi
the rate of inventory investment. In the longerswings the relath
importance of changes in inventoryinvcstmcnt is smaller.
This wide variety of thcorics aboutthe cyclical fluctuatioof
stocks, their causes, and their impacton business cycles isa good
starting point for this study. Thosethat raise questionsthe data can be organized to answerare reexamined below.Othe, aze
helpful because they aid indefining the significanceof the resuJ
yielded by this investigation.And still others willserve to remind
us of issues raised by earlier workthat this studywas unable to re solve.
3Materials for the Studyof Manufacturers'Stocks
The views held inthe past about thebehavior of inventoriesdur. ing business cycles,in both their diversityand simplicity, reflectthe paucity of theinformation availablefor study. Evennow when records of inventoriesare much better, andeven in the United States, for whichrecords are moreplentiful than in othercountric they are seriou.slyinadequate.
Data on American
manufacturers' stocks fallinto two blocki First, thereare estimates of thevalue of inventoriesbased on com- pany balance sheetsor other books ofaccount. The most corn- prehensjre estimatesthat utilizesuch materjaisarc those prepared by SimonKuznets for theperiod SinceIQ i8. From 1926 forward Kuznets builtupon virtuallycomplete report forall corporatioai filed for taxpurposes. Before1926 he dependedin part upon tax reports and inpart upon smaller
samples of corporations. Supple- menting Kuznets'data areestimates by otherinvestigators who rely uponsomewhat differentsources and methods,cover thffer- ent but overlapping
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reports. These series are in current values;Kuznets' data have been
corrected for changes in pricesand so constitute indexes of the
physical volume of manufacturers'stocks.
Because of the breadth of theircoverage the estimates based on
corporate accounts offer the best, indeedthe only fairly reliable,
picture of the behavior ofmanufacturers' stocks asa whole. For
this purpose they are invaluable. Butthey have serious deficiencies
for an analytical study of inventorycycles. The estimates that
cover a considerable number of businesscycles are based onan-
nual reports, an obvious defectin studies of businessmovements
whose duration from peak totrough is sometimesno longer than
12or i 8 months. Of the two availablesets of monthly data, one
starts in 1929 and covers only twocontractions and one expan-
sion in general business beforethe beginning of World War IL
The other beginslfl1939, after the close of the lastprewar cycle.
Another dilliculty with theestimates based oncorporate ac-
counts is their inadequate classification. Totalholdings by manu-
facturers are divided intoa relatively few broad industrialgroups
each of which compiises severallarge industries. Our analysis,
however, suggests that the classificationof inventories that best il-
luminates the factors governing inventorybehavior runs by stage
of fabricationraw materials, goodsin process, finished goods
and by subdivisions of thesestages, rather than by industry.
A final difficulty with this blockof materials is that itneces-
sarily reports inventories in dollar values.Changes in the reported
level of stocks are, therefore, affectedby changes not merely in
physical quantity but also in unit value.29To get an index of the
physical volume of inventories it isnecessary to correct the reported
value figures for the influence of changesin prices, an inherently
treacherous and inaccurateprocess.
Despite all these limitations, thematerials derived fromcor-
porate accounts arc of prime importance. Theyare based either
on large samples of corporations oron full reports for all corpo-
rations. And despite their defects withrespect to form, subdivi-
sion, and frequency, they outlineat least roughly the movements
20 The revaluation ofinventories that accompanies changes in pricesis in
itself a matter of great interest, for itaccounts for a large proportion of the
changes in the book profits of enterprises. Aforthcoming NationalBureau
study of cyclical changes in profits wifl discussthis subject.32
C}1APTERO. S
of manufacturers' stocks as a whole. A theory aboutthe cyclj
behavior of manufacturers' total holdingscan be COflstrlJcted
from the movements of series representingstocks ofpartjc
commodities. As we shall see, however, it isan hypothcsfull of
gaps that must be filled by speculation, and it gains
credibility only
because it can be checked against the broadpattern of manuf.
turers' inventory cycles traced by the nearlycomplete datafrom corporate accounts.
Supplementing the data fromCorporate accountsare a consid.
erable number of series representingthe holdings ofSpecific corn.
modities in physical units. The 38such series usedConstitute all the data that seemed sufficientlytrustworthy andcovered a long
enough period to contributeto a study of businesscycles. The
sources and composition of the individualseries are describedin Appendix G and,as far as necessary, atappropriate points inthe text. Their faults and virtuesare the antitheses of thoseof the cor- porate reports. The commoditymaterials are inno sense a large
or representative collection.Aggregated inany simple fashion, they would presenta misleading picture of thebehavior of manufac- turers' stocks asa whole, On the other hand,they are reported in physical units andat monthly or quarterlyintervals and, best of all, theycover the holdings ofa considcraj)Je variety ofimportant types of stock. Byclassifying theseseries in significantways and by close study oftheir similaritiesand differenceswe can derive valuable informationabout the factorsthat account forthe cycli- cal behavior ofstocks in theaggregate.
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secondly, do inventories typically reach their peaks and troughs
before or after business activity? By studying cycles in the ratio of
inventories to sales and output we attempt to discover also whether
inventories 'pile up' or become unduly large during business ex-
pansions. An explanation of the typical behavior of total inventory
holdings is then sought in succeeding chapters through studies of
several categories of stocks: raw materials, goods in process, and
finished goods, as well as various subcategories. As these classes
typically behave in widely different fashion, there can be no simple
theory about the cyclical behavior of manufacturers' stocks. An
explanation is offered for the behavior of each category. The ac-
tion of the total can be roughly accounted for in terms of the di-
verse behavior of the several components.
Part Three is concerned with cyclical changes in inventory in-
vestment, that is, with changes in the pace at which stocks are
built up or liquidated. Dealing first with the timing of inventory
investment cycles, it asks whether the peaks and troughs of such in-
vestment regularly precede, follow, or coincide with the peaks and
troughs of business cycles. It takes up next the relative timing of
turning points in inventory investment and those in the rate of
change in output. Ensuing chapters are devoted to a study of the
behavior of investment in different types of stock. These studies are
the basis for an explanation of the timing of cycles in aggregate in-
vestment. A final chapter examines the magnitude of the changes
in inventory investment between prosperity and depression, com-
pares them with changes in other components of total output, and
presents a theory to account for the relative importance of inven-
tory investment fluctuations in cycles of different lengths.
Since this investigation tries to build a theory of inventory cycles
from a systematic examination of the data, the exposition is neces-
sarily long and tedious. Specialists who wish to satisfy themselves
about the validity of the results will, of course, want to study the
entire report. Readers with more general interests may grasp the
essentials by following a more selective reading plan. For them,
the following notes may be useful.
The gist of the argument may be found in Chapters 4-5, 13-14,
and 20-I. Chapters 7-12 are concerned with detailed studies of
cyclical fluctuations in stocks of different types: goods in process,::;.
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raw materials, finished goods, and several subdivisionsof these
classes. Chapters 16-19 contain similarly detailed studies of fluctua-
tions in investment in different kinds of inventory. These chapters
are the foundation for the more general accounts of inventoryand
inventory investment cycles in Chapters 13 and 20, but the non-
professional reader may wish to accept the details on trust. Other
chapters are outside the main stream of the argument or serve an
ancillary purpose. Chapter 6 is a digression on cycles in inventory-
sales and inventory-output ratios. Chapter 2 compares manufac-
turers' stocks with holdings in other branches of the economy.
Chapter 3 describes the measures and discusses their reliability.
Briefer descriptions of the measures appear where they arc first
employed. But Chapter 3 will serve readers who want a fuller-
planation or who do not read the book as a whole and so miss the
explanations of measures where they appear in the body of the
argument.
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CHAPTER ONE